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Four years ago some observers predicted that a four year moratorium
on antitrust enforcement would shortly begin. Now that those four years
have passed and another four are beginning it is perhaps an appropriate
time to take stock of the course antitrust has run and some of the prob-
lems it faces.
The pervasiveness of antitrust in American industrial and commer-
cial life may be illustrated by nine examples of the types of business con-
duct that do, or may, transgress the antitrust laws. Agreements
(1) to fix prices
(2) to boycott, or
(3) to divide territories
are traditional per se violations of Sherman Act Section 1. Section 1,
however, as the Court announced in the 1911 Standard Oil' decision is
"an all-embracing enumeration to make sure that no form of transaction
or combination by which undue restraint" is achieved may stand. As a
result,
(4) permanent combination by merger or vertical integration
may raise problems under Section 1. However, as a prac-
tical matter such issues arise largely under Clayton Act
Section 7. Similarly, though
(5) a "tying" arrangement conditioning the sale or lease of
one product on use of another, or
(6) an exclusive dealing plan
may run afoul of Section 1, their legality is more gen-
erally tested under the more rigorous standard of Clayton
Act Section 3.
* This article is based upon an address given by the Honorable Herbert Brownell, Jr.,
on June 20, 1956, before the 1956 Executive Conference on Administrative Policies and
Problems sponsored by the University of Pennsylvania.
* Attorney General of the United States.
1Standard Oil Company of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U. S. 1, 59 (1911).
The same specific acts controlling price and restricting competitive
opportunities prohibited by Section 1 may constitute essential ingredients
of large offenses proscribed by Section 2. Apart from the elements which
Section 2 has in common with Section 1, it establishes three separate
offenses:
(7) to monopolize,
(8) to attempt to monopolize, and
(9) to combine and conspire with others to monopolize any
part of the trade or commerce among the several states
or with foreign nations.
In the past four years, cases brought have been aimed not at proving
doctrinaire economic or social theories, but at making real and prompt
and practical strides toward either cracking restraint on entry by new
persons into an industry, or control over price. Thus, the Justice Depart-
ment's goal has been a vigorous cracking-down on hard core antitrust
violations. Second, because businessmen know this difference in policy
will spell greater court success, pre-trial settlements have jumped sharply.
More results per each enforcement dollar have resulted. Also this policy
helped relieve congestion of Federal Court calendars. Finally, to clarify
those foggy unsettled regions of law and policy, we organized a study
group representing a fair cross section of all antitrust views, and now for
the first time since the Sherman Act's passage we have a survey of the
major decisions under the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts
During 1954, the first full year this Administration ran the Anti-
trust Division, 35 cases were brought; and during calendar years 1955
and 1956, 54 and 46 new cases, respectively, were filed. This record rep-
resents a considerable increase in the number of cases filed over the aver-
age of preceding years.
Not only are more cases filed, but we are striving to keep our cal-
endar up to date. During 1954, 1955, and 1956, some 162 cases were
closed. This represents about a 25 percent increase over the average of
preceding years in cleaning up pending cases.
Once decrees are entered, moreover, we see to it that the parties
live up to them. Thus, in the 66 years since the Sherman Act's passage,
24 contempt proceedings were brought for violation of outstanding de-
crees. Of this 24, one third, or eight, were brought in the past four years.
It should be noted that in our enforcement we endeavor to treat
equally all groups covered by -the antitrust laws. Congress has exempted
some activities, such as certain activities of organized labor, from anti-
trust. Nonetheless, this Administration has moved vigorously to strike
down those union restraints on commercial competition which Congress
has not shielded. Since January, 1953, we have brought 11 cases in which
2 REP ATT'Y GEN. COMM. TO STUDY ANTITRUST LAWS (1955).
a labor union was among the defendants and one case in which a union
was a co-conspirator.
Statistics alone tell only a small part of the story, for cases are filed
with an eye to practical enforcement results. In the Panagra suit,3 for
instance, the Government seeks to spur a competing transport route to
crucial South American markets. Similarly, in the recent RCA proceed-
ing,4 the Government seeks to encourage research in that area of elec-
tronic endeavor so vital to our national welfare and defense. A recent
complaint against RCA and NBC seeks to prevent alleged misuse of the
power of radio networks to grant and withhold network affiliation.5 This
firm interest in practical enforcement results, inspired a turn-down of the
proposed Youngstown-Bethlehem merger. When Bethlehem and Youngs-
town recently announced their agreement to complete their merger, the
Department promptly filed proceedings to enjoin the acquisition.'
In another recent suit, it is charged that General Motors acquired
monopoly control of the manufacture and sale of transit and intercity
buses by proscribed means, and the Government seeks to pry this field
open for a revival of active competition."
In another action, now before the Supreme Court,' the Department
is asking that duPont's stock control in General Motors be divested.
The purpose and extent of economic analysis differs from case to
case. As the Report of the Attorney General's Committee to Study the
Antitrust Laws put it:9
In antitrust cases, courts may be called upon to measure the actual or prob-
able effect of business conduct upon competition. Where agreements to con-
trol market prices or output are charged, the only issue is whether the alleged
practice did in fact occur, since the effect on competition is known to be so
adverse that the practice is unreasonable per se. Practices which are not un-
reasonable per se are those from which a fixed set of effects do not necessarily
follow. They are subject to more extensive market inquiry under the standards
of the antitrust laws. This means that their actual or probable market conse-
quences must be determined as part of the test of their legality. Such deter-
mination, in turn, involves resort to economic analysis.
The Supreme Court's recent 4-3 decision in the duPont Cellophane
case highlights the sort of economic data that may be relevant to proof
of monopolization under Section 2. The Supreme Court there upheld the
district court's findings that "the 'great sensitivity of customers in the
flexible packaging markets to price or quality changes' prevented duPont
from possessing monopoly control over price."'" Accordingly, the Court
s United States v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., et al., S.D. N.Y., Civ. No.
90-259.
4 United States v. Radio Corporation of America, S.D. N.Y., Civ. No. 97-38.
5 United States v. Radio Corporation of America, E.D. Pa., Civ. No. 21743.
6 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corporation, et al., S.D. N.Y., Civ. No. 115-328.
United States v. General Motors Corp., E.D. Mich., Civ. No. 15816.
8 United States v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., Civ. No. 49C-1071.
9 Supra note 2, at 315.
10 United States v. E. I. duPont deNemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377, 400 (1956).
concluded "that cellophane's interchangeability with other materials suf-
fices to make it a part of this flexible packaging material market.""
The majority's beginning point was: "Illegal power must be ap-
praised in terms of the competitive market for the product."' 2 The Gov-
ernment's "charge," in the language of the Court, was "monopolization
of cellophane. The defense that cellophane was merely a part of the rele-
vant market for flexible packaging materials." Deciding "what is the
relevant market for determining the control of price and competition,"
the Court reasoned, "no more definite rule can be declared than that com-
modities reasonably interchangeable by consumers for the same purposes
make up that 'part of the trade or commerce,' monopolization of which
may be illegal."" Applying that test to the facts at bar, the Court deemed
most relevant "the use or uses to which the commodity is put."'4 Though
the Court conceded that cellophane "differs from other flexible packaging
materials," '" it noted that "it has to meet competition from other materi-
als in every one of its uses.""8 "Moreover," the Court emphasized, "a very
considerable degree of functional interchangeability exists between these
products."" Accordingly, ruling against the Government, the Court held
that, for Section 2 purposes, the relevant:
* * * market is composed of products that have reasonable interchange-
ability for the purposes for which they are produced-price, use and qualities
considered. While the application of the tests remains uncertain, it seems to us
that du Pont should not be found to monopolize cellophane when that product
has the competition and interchangeability with other wrappings that this
record shows.' 8
With that conclusion, the dissent disagreed. As Chief Justice Warren
put it: "We cannot agree that cellophane * * * is 'the selfsame product'
as glassine, grease proof and vegetable parchment papers, waxed papers
* * * and other films."'" If "the conduct of buyers indicated * * * [these
other wrappings] were actually the 'selfsame products' as cellophane,"
the Chief Justice reasoned "the qualitative differences * * * would not be
conclusive. But the record provides convincing proof that businessmen
did not so regard the products"; we "cannot believe," the dissent went on,
"that buyers, practical businessmen, would have bought cellophane in
increasing amounts * * * if close substitutes were available at from one-
seventh to one-half cellophane's price."2 Accordingly, the dissent con-
"United States v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
12 Id. at 393.
Is Id. at 395.
14 Id. at 396.
15 Id. at 397.
16 Id. at 399.
17 Id. at 399.
'8 Id. at 404.
'9 Id. at 414-415 (dissent).
201 d. at 416-417.
cluded:
* * * the record shows conclusively that cellophane is the relevant market.
Since du Pont has the lion's share of that market, it must have monopoly
power * * * This being so, we think it clear that in the circumstances of
this case du Pont is guilty of monopolization.
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Against this background of enforcement experience thus far, what
recommendations for improvements in the effectiveness of the antitrust
laws has the present Administration offered? One measure increased ten-
fold the maximum fine for violation of the antitrust laws.22 The first
sentences under this higher penalty were made February 25, 1957, upon
pleas of nolo contendere to charges of price fixing.2"
The Economic Report of the President, sent to the Congress a year
ago,24 set forth a number of other recommendations, of which three major
ones were:
* * * First, all firms of significant size that are engaged in interstate com-
merce and plan to merge should be required to give advance notice of the
proposed merger to the antitrust agencies and to supply the information needed
to assess its probable impact on competition. Second, Federal regulation should
be extended to all mergers of banking institutions. Combined with the re-
quirement for advance notice, this extension of the law would give the
Government an opportunity to prevent mergers that are likely to result in
undue restraint on banking competition.
* * * When civil rather than criminal proceedings are contemplated, the
Attorney General should be empowered to issue a civil investigative demand,
compelling the production of documents before the filing of a complaint, and
without having to invoke grand jury proceedings.
Legislation to carry out each of these three proposals was introduced
in the 84th Congress. Amendments providing for pre-merger notification
and bringing bank asset acquisitions within Section 7 of the Clayton Act
were passed by the House and reported out by the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee but not passed upon by the Senate. Bills empowering use of a
civil investigative demand got no further than the Judiciary Committees
of the House and Senate.
In his latest Economic Report, the President again urged the need
for these three amendments.22 Bills on pre-merger notification and bank
asset acquisitions have already been introduced in the 85th Congress and
are under study by the House Judiciary Committee."
There are a number of considerations behind the need for pre-
merger notification. At the present time some 19 lawyers are assigned to
the section of the Antitrust Division with primary responsibility for anti-
trust merger activity. Beyond these 19 lawyers, one more lawyer and some
five economists devote part of their time to merger work. Before mergers
21 Id. at 425.
2 2 Pub. L. No. 135, c. 281, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (July 7, 1955).
23 In United States v. Blaw-knox, et al., W.D. N.C., Cr. No. 893, one defendant was
fined $12,500, and another $6,500.2 4 
ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 78-79 (Jan. 24, 1956).
2 5 ECONOMIC REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT 51 (Jan. 23, 1957).
26 H. R. REP. No. 2143 and H. R. REP. No. 264.
can be appraised with an eye to clearance or suit, they must, of course, be
discovered. Our experience has been that a good part of the time and
effort of this staff is occupied with discovering mergers before they occur.
Pre-merger notification would substantially ease this investigative
burden. No longer would enforcement staffs be required to scan the
variety of financial periodicals they now do. More important, many merg-
ers not presently publicized in advance of consummation would be
brought to our attention. Since 1953, the Department has preliminarily
examined over 2,000 mergers, and set up special merger files in 160
instances which merited detailed inquiry. In 11 suit was filed, but, in some
25 cases, some phase of the acquisition was consummated before it came
to the attention of the Justice Department. In another 25, the fact of
merger was not known to the Department sufficiently in advance to
enable intelligent decision as to whether to sue before the merger was
consummated.
In approximately one-third of our detailed examinations, then, pre-
merger notification would have afforded a chance to take action before
assets of merging companies had been commingled. We wish to avoid
problems stemming from the quite understandable judicial reluctance to
attempt the task of separating companies that already have been joined.
Not only will the enforcement burden be eased, but pre-merger
notification may well benefit the business community. Lawyers represent-
ing merging companies have at times stated that disruption of business
plans is lessened by Department action before merger consummation.
Pre-merger notification, it seems clear, should systematize the process by
which mergers are sifted and thus enable more prompt action if it is
merited.
Further, evenhanded enforcement requires notification. With that
requirement, no longer would the company that tries to obey the law and
seeks advance approval watch its close-mouthed rival consummate a
merger, and thereafter rely on the natural indisposition of an enforce-
ment agency or a court to attempt to unscramble the omelet. Thus mini-
mized is the element of chance discovery in any decision to sue.
The proposal to amend Clayton Act Section 7 to cover bank asset
as well as stock acquisitions seeks to plug that loophole left by present
Section 7's failure to cover asset acquisition by banks. On the one hand,
that provision's stock acquisition bar applies to all corporations "engaged
in commerce." Section 7's asset acquisition portion covers only corpora-
tions "'subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission." Sec-
tion 11 of the Clayton Act exempts banks from Federal Trade Commis-
sion jurisdiction by specifying that "authority to enforce compliance" with
Section 7 "is hereby vested * * * in the Federal Reserve Board where
applicable to banks, banking associations, and trust companies." On the
basis of these provisions, this Department concluded that asset acquisition
by banks is not covered by Section 7 as amended in 1950.7
As a result, Section 7 is for practical purposes useless to cope with
what the Comptroller of the Currency has described as "this recent trend
of [bank] mergers, consolidations, and sales."28 Corroborating the rise in
bank mergers, the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve Board concluded that bank mergers "have gone up steadily."2
In 1952, his testimony reveals, there were 100 bank mergers. This num-
ber jumped to 116 in 1953 and more than doubled to 207 in 1954.80
Most important, the Federal Reserve Board Chairman concluded, this
number is "still rising.""
Mergers may meet Sherman Act standards, yet fall before the Clay-
ton Act's more stringent bans. Congress's clear object by its 1950 amend-
ment of Section 7 of the Clayton Act was to strike some mergers beyond
the reach of the Sherman Act. Thus the Senate report explains that the
bill is not intended to revert to the Sherman Act test. The intent here * * * is
to cope with monopolistic tendencies in their incipiency and well before they
have attained such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding.
8 2
The report further states that the Act's intent is to have
broad application to acquisitions that are economically significant * [The)
various additions and deletions, some strengthening and others weakening the
bill, are not conflicting in purpose or effect. They are merely different steps
toward the same objective, namely, that of framing a bill which although
dropping portions of the so-called Clayton Act test that have no economic
significance, reaches far beyond the Sherman Act.
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To apply this Clayton Act standard to bank asset acquisitions is the
aim of the new proposal, which is endorsed by the President of the United
States, the Department of Justice, and the Federal Trade Commission.
The third of these legislative proposals would enable the Depart-
ment of Justice to compel production of documents by corporations, part-
nerships, and associations-but not individuals-during the investigative
or pre-complaint stage of civil proceedings.
27 Reaching the same conclusion, a House Judiciary subcommittee staff report explained
that, because of revisions in amendments to Section 7 . . .."it became impracticable to
include within the scope of the act, corporations other than those subject to regulation by
the Federal Trade Commission. Banks, which are placed squarely within the authority of
the Federal Reserve Board by Sec. 11 of the Clayton Act, are therefore circumscribed insofar
as mergers are concerned only by the old provisions of Sec. 7 ..." STAFF REPORT TO
SUBCOMMITTEE No. 5 OF THE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, House of Rep., 82nd
Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
28 Hearings on Current Antitrust Problems, before House Antitrust Subcommittee, 84th
Cong., 1st Sess. 453 (1955).
20 Hearings on A Study of the Antitrust Laws, before Senate Antitrust Subcommittee,
84th Cong., 1st Sess. 680 (1955).
30 Hearings, supra note 28, at 2159.
31 Hearings, supra note 29, at 680.
3
2 SEN. REP. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 4-5 (1950).
33 Ibid.
Under present law, the Department has no such power. Where
criminal proceedings are contemplated, of course, grand jury process ade-
quately enables production of both documentary and oral evidence. Where
the Department proceeds with an eye to civil proceedings, however, ex-
perience shows that the Antitrust Division is severely handicapped. Some
potential defendants may voluntarily grant access to their records. In
other instances, however, a grand jury investigation must be initiated,
and the court's power of subpoena used in order to obtain documents.
One result of resort to grand jury action is extensive delay and expense.
Finally, the Government may resort to filing a complaint and then make
use of discovery processes of the Federal Rules to gather evidence. Effec-
tive enforcement, however, requires comprehensive civil investigation be-
fore-rather than after-formal proceedings have been filed.
In sum, then, two of our three main proposals, pre-merger notifica-
tion and civil investigative demand, aim to secure, more rapidly, accurate
and complete market data. Only thus can intelligent decisions be made
in individual cases. Underscoring the importance of these new means for
securing market evidence is that, as the Federal Trade Commission Merger
Report explained, "Examination of the antitrust cases in which market
share information has played a conspicuous role will show that such cases
have been brought in fields where the pertinent industries or markets
were under regulation and tax or license data permitted full coverage of
the market,"8 for example, American Tobacco,8" Yellow Cab,8" and
Standard Stations," or "where standard published statistics and definitive
lists of companies have been available," for example, Appalachian Coals,88
Alcoa,89 and Paramount."' The proposed legislation may well remedy this
defect.
There also has been a development beyond the pending legislation.
It came when the President signed S 3879, enabling franchised automo-
bile dealers to sue in federal court for damages stemming from automobile
manufacturers' "coercion, intimidation, or threats" in performing, can-
celling, or not renewing dealer franchise contracts. In a statement at that
time, the President directed that the Department of Justice review condi-
tions in the automobile industry which brought about the demand for the
legislation to determine whether they continue to exist, to study alterna-
tive or different solutions to the problem, and to make recommendations
for appropriate action by the 85th Congress. The Department undertook,
as a part of its program to carry out this directive, a full field investiga-
tion of the organization and administration of General Motors' dealer
84 FTC REP. ON CORPORATE MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 179-180 (1955).
85 American Tobacco Co., et al. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781 (1946).
81 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 318 (1947).
37 United States v. Standard Oil Co. of Cal., 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
88 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 357 (1933).
8 9 United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, et al., 148 F.2d 416 (2nd Cir. 1945).
40 United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., et al., 334 U.S. 131 (1948).
advertising fund. During the pendency of this investigation, General
Motors announced that it was discontinuing the dealer advertising fund,
that henceforth dealers' contributions to the General Motors fund would
be eliminated and that it would refund to each dealer the unspent portion
of his contributions to the fund.
Congress has, in the past few years, imposed on the Justice Depart-
ment new obligations to make broad economic surveys. The 1955 amend-
ments to the Defense Production Act, for example, require the Attorney
General to undertake surveys and report to the President and Congress,
every three months "for the purpose of determining any factors which
may tend to eliminate competition, create or strengthen monopolies, in-
jure small business, or otherwise permit undue concentration of economic
power in the course of the administration of this Act." In like fashion,
the Small Business Act now requires the Attorney General to make simi-
lar surveys and reports, relative to small business administration, "at such
times * * * as he deems desirable." And one Senate Report in the 84th
Congress requests the Department of Justice to report to Congress each
year for the first ten years following the sale of Government-owned rub-
ber producing facilities. 1 Finally, Congress, granting consent to the ex-
tension of an interstate compact to conserve oil and gas, provided that
the Attorney General shall make an annual report to Congress "for the
duration of the Interstate Compact to Conserve Oil and Gas, as to whether
or not the activities of the States under the provisions of such compact
have been consistent," generally speaking, with the established antitrust
principles. 2
The role antitrust plays in preserving national prosperity is impor-
tant to all of us. In 1776, Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations, comparing
Britain and the United States, noted:
But though North America is not yet so rich as England, it is much more
thriving, and advancing with much greater rapidity to the further acquisition
of riches.
Since that day hardly a year has passed without some like exclama-
tion of wonder from students of economics. For example, in 1939,
Michael Chevalier, in his Society, Manners and Politics in the United
States, remarked on the difference between his own France and what he
sees here:
An American's business is always to be on edge lest his neighbor get there
before him . . . Industry has become a veritable battlefield . . . Unlimited
competition [has] become the sole law of labor, everyone being his own
master.
These observations are firmly rooted in the realities of our national
income statistics. National income of necessity rests upon national pro-
duction, our productivity.
41 SEN. REP. No. 117, 84th Cong., 1st Sess.
42 Pub. L. No. 185, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. §2.
America produces one-third of the total goods in the world and
one-half the manufactured goods with one-fifteenth of the land area of
the world, one-fifteenth of the people of the world, and one-fifteenth of
the natural resources of the world.
Perhaps influenced by this striking comparison, a noted Swiss politi-
cal economist, William E. Rappard, concluded in his study, The Secret of
American Prosperity published as recently as May of 1955, "that the
United States today enjoys a much greater average income than any other
nation. The material standard of living is, therefore, by far the highest
in the world." Seeking the reason for this, Mr. Rappard wrote Mr. John
S. Crout, Director of the renowned Battelle Institute. Explaining Ameri-
can growth, Mr. Crout reasoned: Antitrust has
compelled corporate managements to reconsider their position. They realized
that they were required to compete, but had no hope of ever establishing a
monopoly.
Under these circumstances, they accepted the concept of true competition
and directed their energies and efforts to ways and means of increasing their
profits by expansion of their volume of business.
In essence, this meant that each management set out to do a better job of
producing, selling and distributing its products than its competitors.
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A like conclusion was reached by a British study team that recently
visited this country. As a result of the Marshall Plan, international study
centers were organized to study the reasons for the superior productivity
of American industry. The Anglo-American Council on Productivity was
set up. It was responsible for organizing British teams of managers, tech-
nicians and trade unionists, who came to the United States to see what
methods used here could be adapted to the needs of Great Britain. Sixty-
six teams had made the trip by late 1952. They presented reports which
were practically unanimous.
An American newspaper reported under a London dateline in late
1954 the return of one of the latest teams. The New York Times headline
read:
Productivity Team Lays U. S. Output Supremacy Largely to Sherman,
Clayton Acts
Hits Own Country's Law
Parliament Urged to Act on Manufacturer Pacts That End Competition
That newspaper's account went on:
The praise for the Sherman and Clayton Antitrust Acts was included in the
industrial engineer's report because, according to members of the group,
"it was the answer we kept getting when we asked Americans what was the
source of the competitiveness in their economy." The group's secretary . . .
remarked that ". . . the monopolies issue has become a part of the public
morality of the United States; it is enforced by public opinion."
And so we see the importance that antitrust enforcement assumes, in the
eyes of others. It has withstood the crucible not only of time, but of study.
Today it stands as one of the prime supports for our prosperous and free
competitive economy. In its preservation all Americans have a vital stake.
4
3 WILLIAM E. RAPPARD, THE SECRET OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY 67 (1955).
